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ABSTRACT 
 
 Board independence is seen as a corporate governance mechanism. High 
level of board independence means that the board will consider whole 
shareholders’ interests. As high quality auditor provides more benefit for the 
whole shareholders, firm with high level of board independence will choose high 
quality auditor. However, in emerging country which has low investor protection, 
such as Indonesia, family control over a firm can be seen as a threat to minority 
shareholders. Controlling family has a desire to gain private benefits through 
expropriation. In such firm, the family places its member on strategic position, 
such as chairman of commissioner or vice-chairman. Because the chairman 
position is held by the family, the decision of board can be biased toward the 
interest of the family, including choosing lower quality auditor to maintain 
family’s private benefits. Hence, family control in a firm can moderate the effect 
the board independence independent variable on audit quality chosen by a firm. 
This research also includes several control variables, such as audit complexity, 
firm size, leverage, and profitability. This research also includes additional 
analysis that analyze the model without moderating effect and use family control 
as another independent variable. 
Keyword: Audit quality, board independence, family control, audit 
complexity, firm size, leverage, and profitability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
